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IT'S NOT JUST YOUR FATHER'S GAME
ANYMORE: RECENT CONNECTICUT
LEGISLATION PROHIBITS GENDER
DISCRIMINATION AT GOLF COUNTRY CLUBS
INTRODUCTION

Since youth-phenom Tiger Woods joined the Professional Golf
Association tour last year, there has been a dramatic increase in the
popularity of golf. What was once mainly a game enjoyed by
white male professionals has expanded to include people of all
races, ages, and genders.
Golf country clubs, traditionally
considered to be havens of racism, sexism, and other forms of
bigotry, are reversing their philosophies by recognizing the
changing nature of the game and admitting more minorities and
women as members.!
Even if a country club allows a person to become a member,
that person may still experience discrimination. For example,
discrimination based on gender still exists at many country clubs
throughout the nation.2 Even if a woman becomes a member at a
country club, there may be rules that limit the days and times when
she is allowed on the course, prohibit her from eating or
congregating in certain clubhouse areas, and deny her some or all
membership voting rights
Although women have made advances in the business world,
which enables more of them to afford the high cost of country club
membership, the door of equality may be closed abruptly once they
1. This is not to suggest that race and gender discrimination are not still
widespread at golf country clubs. For example, Augusta National, where the
Masters Tournament is held, has recently admitted only 2 minority males and no

women to its membership body of 250. Other clubs, such as Shoal Creek in
Birmingham, Alabama, admitted token minority members after the PGA
threatened not to hold tournament events at those sites. Tiger Woods has also
been criticized for practicing at Lochinvar Country Club in Houston which
discriminates against women.
2. Marcia Chambers, No Room in the Grill: Woman Sues Country Club for
Discrimination,1997 WL-NYT 9728200001, Oct. 9, 1997.
3. Id.
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enter the gates of these bastions of elitism.4 The Hartford Courant
newspaper illustrated this when it profiled a business woman who
joined an exclusive suburban Connecticut country club as a full
member, paying a large initiation fee and annual dues of
approximately $6,000.' Males who obtain full membership status
must pay the same amount.6 Despite making equal payments, she
cannot eat in the all-male dining area, sit on the club's governing
board, or play a round of golf whenever she wants.7
Unfortunately, this situation is often the rule, not the exception.
Some country clubs try to compensate for the tee off time
restrictions by setting a time period just for women. These slots
are often less desirable times to play, usually falling on weekdays,
whereas the men are given weekend times for their exclusive use.'
This may have been a viable arrangement a generation ago when
the only females who played golf were the non-working wives of
wealthy male members. This is no longer the reality. Working
women are becoming club members on their own.9 Accordingly,
tee off time restrictions are outdated and prevent women from
maximizing the use of their costly country club memberships.
In Connecticut, a state known for its affluent golfers and bucolic
New England surroundings, the legislature recently passed a law
prohibiting gender discrimination at golf country clubs in an effort
to remedy this problem.'" This Act proscribes the denial of
membership, mandates the equal use of its facilities to members,
and states that all membership classes shall be the same."
4.Id.
5. Editorial, HARTFORD COURANT, Apr.2,1997, at A10.
6. Id.

7.Id.
8.Id. (mentioning that at Connecticut's Madison Country Club, Saturday
morning is reserved for men, while Thursday morning is set aside for women,
who are usually working to afford the hefty membership fees on that day) See
also Kerri S.Smith, Tee Times "Not Prime Time" for Women, DENVER POST,
August 2,1997, at AA01 (noting that a telephone survey of 21 private golf clubs
in the Denver area revealed that two-thirds of them exclude women "during the

most popular hours of play").
9. See Chambers,supranote 2.
10. Act Concerning Discrimination by Golf Country Clubs, 1997 Conn.
Legis. Serv. P.A. 97-85 (West).
11. Id.§1(c).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol8/iss1/9
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This article will examine Connecticut's new Act. Section I of
this article focuses on the contents of the Act. Section II reports on
the responses to it. Section II describes how other states have
addressed this problem. Section IV examines a state's power to
regulate private clubs. Section V explains how Connecticut's law
furthers its goal of eliminating discrimination.
I. THE CONNECTICUT ACT CONCERNING GENDER DISCRIMINATION
BY GOLF COUNTRY CLUBS

Upon hearing testimony from female country club members
detailing the discriminatory practices of those institutions
throughout the state," the Connecticut legislature passed an Act
Concerning Gender Discrimination at Golf Country Clubs. 1 3 The
Act, which will take effect on January 1, 1998, defines country
clubs, creates state authority over the clubs, proscribes
discriminatory conduct, and provides a remedy for violations.' 4
In response to the clubs' past membership restrictions, the
Connecticut legislation sets forth clear provisions that regulate a
country club's conduct. '5 The statement of purpose of the act is
"[tlo prohibit country clubs and golf clubs discriminating in
membership and access to its facilities and services."' 6 The law
provides that "no golf country club many deny membership.., to
any person on account of race, religion, color, national origin,
ancestry, sex, marital status or sexual orientation." 7 It also
prohibits the type of discrimination about which the women
testified by mandating that "all cases of membership in a golf
country club shall be available without regard to race, religion,
color, national origin, ancestry, sex, marital status or sexual
orientation.""
12. Marcia Chambers, Female Golfers Are Challenging Country Club Rules,
N. Y. TIMES, March 28, 1997, at B2.

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

P.A. 97-85.
Id.
Id. §1
CoNN. H.B. 6398 (West 1997).
P.A. 97-85, § 1(b).

18. Id. § l(c).
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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The Act defines a golf club as an association of persons
"consisting of not less than twenty members who pay membership
fees or dues and which maintains a golf course of not less than nine
holes."19 The other criterion is that the club receives payment for
dues, fees, use of space, facilities, services, meals or beverages,
directly or indirectly, from or on behalf of non-members.2" This
non-member requirement will usually be met because most clubs
allow members to bring guests. Guests usually have to pay an
additional fee to participate in any of the activities provided by a
country club, including playing a round of golf. By including this
section, Connecticut legislators realized that when clubs allow nonmembers to partake in a club's events, the country club is opening
up its facilities to the public to some extent, thus opening itself to
state regulation."
Opponents of the legislation argue that a state does not have
authority to regulate a private entity such as a golf country club.
However, the state has created some leverage in this area. Section
1 (a) (2) of the Act affirnatively provides that if the club holds a
permit to sell liquor that a Connecticut state agency granted, 2 the
club is subject to the provisions of the act. The State cannot close
down a country club if it violates the act, but it can revoke the
liquor license issued to the country club.23 Since most country
clubs depend on selling alcoholic beverages to raise a significant
portion of their revenue, holding their liquor licenses in the balance
is a powerful incentive to induce country clubs to comply with the
new regulation.
Connecticut's new statute also provides a remedy for a country
club's discriminatory action. An aggrieved party may bring a civil
action in a Superior Court, both in equity and at law.24 The action
may seek to enjoin further violations, and a plaintiff may recover
actual damages sustained by a violation or two hundred fifty
dollars, whichever is greater.2 5 Moreover, a plaintiff may also
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id. § 1(a)(1).
P.A. 97-85, § 1(a).
Id.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 30-1 etseq. (1997).
P.A. 97-85, § 1(g).

24. Id. § 1 (g).
25. Id.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol8/iss1/9
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receive costs and reasonable attorney's fees.26 In addition to the
private remedy afforded to plaintiff, Connecticut reserves the right
to suspend a violating club's liquor license until the state
determines that the violation has been corrected.
Connecticut legislators have responded to its affluent
constituents by passing a law to ensure that the majority, if not all,
female country club members will not be denied the services for
which they have paid. This is not a law without teeth. By
including the remedies listed above, private country clubs are put
on notice that Connecticut will not tolerate their long-standing
discriminatory practices.
II. RESPONSES TO THE ACT

Interestingly, many powerful Connecticut women are opposed to
the Act, while there are many males who supported it, showing that
battle lines of gender equality are not drawn along gender lines.
Valerie Bulkeley, the first female president of the Hartford Golf
Club, responded, "I am opposed to discrimination obviously. But
when it comes to the internal workings of a club, I think you have
'
to work that out within the club."28
With that statement, Ms.
Bulkeley disregards that the vast majority of country club members
traditionally are male; most clubs' governing boards are
overwhelmingly male, and will continue to discriminate against
women who pay the same amount of membership fees unless there
are rules in place forbidding it.
Connecticut State Representative Marilyn Hess (R-Greenwich)
voted against the bill.29 Hess, a member of the exclusive
Greenwich Country Club located in that wealthy hamlet, agreed
that the proper forum to change current practice is a club's board of

26. Id.
27. Id. § 1 (h).
28. Maxine Bernstein, Female Golfers Looking to Strike DiscriminationAim
to Eliminate Sex Based Biases at Private Clubs, HARTFORD COURANT, Apr. 1,
1997, at A3.
29. Matthew Daly, Bill Would Give Women Country-Club Equality,
HARTFORD COURANT, May 8, 1997, at A3.
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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directors, not the General Assembly." Her view on the issue is
best described by her quote, "why the legislature should have
anything to do with it is beyond me."31 Other representatives
thought that the easiest way to solve the problem would be for
women simply not to join golf country clubs that engaged in
discriminatory practices."
However, the Act passed, with many legislators wholeheartedly supporting the bill. For example, the bill's sponsor, Rep.
Ellen Scalettar (D-Woodbridge), claimed that "[p]eople are
shocked this goes on in this day and age -- but it does."33 This
reaction was not limited to female lawmakers. Rep. Scott SantaMaria (R-Brookfield), summarized his views by saying: "This is
1997, folks, and the last time I checked women weren't secondclass citizens. Yet the clubs, many of them, treat women as
' Connecticut's Attorney General, Richard
second-class citizens."34
Blumenthal, also supported the bill.35 He conceded that, "clubs
should be able to establish whatever rules they want," but
maintained that "the state should not be a participant where there is
illegal discrimination."36
There were concerns within the legislature that the bill would
not achieve its worthy goal of eliminating discrimination in the
private country club setting due to the language used when it was
drafted.37 The problem, debated extensively by the legislature, was

30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Bernstein, supra note 28, at A3. During testimony before the Connecticut
State Assembly, State Rep. Michael J. Jarjura (D-Waterbury) asked why a
woman would want to join a club that discriminates in this manner. A woman
who had been a member of an exclusive country club for fifteen years
responded that while this treatment may have been acceptable fifteen years ago,
it is not justifiable any longer.
33. Daly, supra note 29, at A3.
34. Id.
35. Bernstein, supra note 28, at A3.
36. Id. As far as state participation, Blumenthal was probably referring to the
state-issued liquor licenses. Granting or continuing to provide these licenses to
clubs that discriminate would be tantamount to Connecticut condoning their
antiquated behavior.
37. Daly, supra note 29, at A3.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol8/iss1/9
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the intent behind section l(g) of the statute. 8 This section states
that "[n]othing in this section shall be construed to prohibit a golf
country club from sponsoring or permitting events that are limited
to members of one sex if such club sponsors or permits events that
'
are comparable for members of each sex."39
While this does not
affect the goal of granting women equal membership voting power,
if construed literally, this provision would defeat one of the main
purposes of the act: to eliminate restrictions on playing time based
on gender. Opponents of the bill argued that this section gave a
golf country club permission to limit some tee times only for men,
as long as equal times were set aside for women only.4" If this was
the correct interpretation, then clubs were free to restrict prime
weekend tee times for men as long as comparable, but different,
times were devoted solely to women.
When questioned on that point, Rep. Scalettar replied that the
"separate but equal" tee times would not be allowed under the act,
because weekday tee times are less desirable than weekend times,
thereby rendering those times incomparable for purposes of the
41
Act.
Il.

OTHER STATES' SOLUTIONS

Connecticut is not the first state to deal with this form of gender
discrimination. However, it is unique in the way that it addressed
the problem. This is because the Connecticut legislation provides
specific legal and equitable remedies for a wronged party.
Another northeast state, New Jersey, has followed in
Connecticut's footsteps and passed a similar measure on August 1,
1997.42 However, rather than creating a new law, New Jersey
amended its existing public accommodation discrimination
statute. 43 According to the language of the new section, a private
club or association cannot:
38. Id.

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

P.A. 97-85, § 1(g).
Bernstein, supranote 28, at A3.
Daly, supranote 29, at A3.
1997 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 179 (West).
Id.
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directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from, or deny
to any individual who has been accepted as a club
member and has contracted for or is otherwise
entitled to full club membership any of the
accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges
thereof, or to discriminate against any member in
the furnishing thereof on account of the race, creed,
color, national origin, ancestry, marital status, sex,
affectional or sexual orientation or nationality of
such person.'
Like Connecticut, New Jersey has reserved its right to exercise its
authority over state-issued liquor licenses if a violation is
discovered."
One significant difference between the Connecticut and New
Jersey legislation is that New Jersey's prohibition only applies to
those people who have already been admitted as full members to a
private club.46 This gives clubs the right to refuse to admit women
if they choose.4 7 Therefore, the New Jersey law does not further
the ultimate goal of prohibiting gender or race as member selection
criteria. The amendment simply protects existing women from
being treated as second-class citizens at private clubs.
Unfortunately, private clubs may respond by curtailing their
admittance of women.
Other states do not ban discrimination on golf courses outright,
but give favorable tax treatment to those who belong to country
clubs that do not discriminate. For example, Iowa's Attorney
General has interpreted numerous provisions of that state's code,
concluding that individuals who belong to private clubs that
44. Id.
45. Id. Maine also uses its liquor licenses as leverage, with a specific
provision that denies eligibility to golf clubs or restaurants that the Maine
Human Rights Commission has found to have denied membership to a person
for discriminatory reasons. ME. Rv. STAT. ANN. tit. 28-A, § 601 (2) (J) (West
1997).
46. 1997 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 179.
47. Ron Marisco, BroaderEquality Law Suits Women to a Tee: Golf Clubs
Can't Favor Their Male Players, NEWARK STAR LEDGER, August 2, 1997, at
009.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol8/iss1/9
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discriminate on the basis of age, sex, marital status, race, religion,
color, ancestry, or national origin will be disallowed from taking a
personal income tax deduction on the money paid to that club.4"
The Iowa Attorney General's opinion specifically states that no
personal tax deduction will be allowed, "for Iowa income tax
purposes, if a club imposes time and/or place limitations or
restrictions upon the use of its services or facilities based upon age
or sex."49' Despite this ruling, separate tournaments based upon the
gender of the participants do not per se destroy the deductibility of
money paid to the club as long as the services and facilities of the
club are not monopolized by a single sex during the tournament. 0
However, the clubs cannot abuse that privilege. "If the services or
facilities of the club are monopolized by members of a single sex
during the tournaments, the deductibility of all expenditures made
at, and payments made to, the club is destroyed.""1 The opinion
stressed that discrimination is not prohibited per se, but tax
deductions for payments made to private clubs are denied to those
"who patronize private clubs which employ such restrictions.""2
Gender discrimination on golf courses is not limited to the
United States. This battle is raging in other countries where golfing
is prevalent. In Great Britain, for example, the government is
planning an "overhaul of legislation" that would empower women
members to take private country clubs to court if they suffer
discrimination. 3

48. 1992 Op. Iowa Att'y Gen. 126, 1992 WL 470349. This opinion relies
heavily on Ladd v. Iowa West Racing Assoc., 438 N.W.2d 600 (1989); and

interprets IOWA CODE §§ 422.7(24), 422.9 (2) (g), 422.35 (14) (1991).
49. 1992 Op. Iowa Att'y Gen. 126.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Rajeev Syal & Edward Welsh, Women Golfers on Course for Club
Equality, SUNDAY TIMES - LONDON, July 20, 1997, at News 10 (noting that the
goal of legislation is to comply with European Union Articles prohibiting

gender discrimination. This would not affect British clubs that cater solely to
men).
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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IV. STATE POWER TO REGULATE PRIVATE CLUBS - IS THERE A
FIRST AMENDMENT VIOLATION?

The United States Congress enacted Federal Civil Rights
legislation to prevent discrimination in public places in response to
the Civil Rights movement in the early 1960s. 4 In the federal
legislation, Congress purposely excluded private clubs from the
reach of its public accommodation mandate.55 Connecticut, as well
as many other northern states, already had similar statutes to
combat discrimination in public places.56
California is one of the first states to determine that some
private golf clubs can nevertheless be regulated by the state under
public accommodation mandates and be ordered not to
discriminate. California's Civil Code section 51, also known as the
"Unruh Civil Rights Act," takes a different approach on defining
what types of facilities are prohibited from discriminating against
Instead of describing the facilities as public
groups.57
accommodations, California exercises authority over "business
establishments of any kind whatsoever."58
The California Supreme Court, in the case of Warfield v.
Peninsula Golf & Country Club, 9 held that a private, nonprofit
golf country club could be a business establishment for purposes of
the Unruh Act.6" This is not, however, a black letter rule. The
Court recognized that a private social club is not generally
considered a traditional business establishment, but determined
that this does not remove a private club automatically from the
Unruh Act's control.6 ' The Court examined several factors when
54. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a etseq. (1997).
55. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(e) (stating that prohibition against discrimination in
places of public accommodation does not apply to a private club or other
establishment not open to the public).
56. Connecticut enacted its public accommodations law in 1949. See CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-35. (West).
57. CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West 1997).
58. Id.
59. 896 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1995).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 789. Other states, such as Montana, have relied solely on their
public accommodation statutes to hold that a golf club unlawfully discriminated
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol8/iss1/9
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ruling that the club in question was subject to the Unruh Act: (1)
the club had over 700 members; (2) the club engaged in regular
business because it charged non-members to participate in club
activities as guests of members; and (3) members conducted
business among themselves in the form of transactions and
negotiations carried out during a round of golf.62
Peninsula Golf & Country Club asserted that this type of
regulation unconstitutionally infringed its freedom to associate.6
The California Supreme Court rejected this argument after
examining the United States Supreme Court's line of cases
regarding the ability of private organizations to exclude certain
groups of people from its membership.'
In Roberts v. United
States Jaycees," the Supreme Court did not allow a chapter to
exclude women from becoming members as a result of their
participation in many areas of the club in non-member capacities. 6
In deciding Roberts, the Court created a new test to determine
whether a club could be regulated because of its business activities,
named the "predominantly commercial activity test., 67 The Court
held that since many clubs or associations cannot be classified as
purely expressive or purely commercial, the standard must "accept
the reality that even the most expressive of associations is likely to
touch in some way or another, matters of commerce."68 Under this
analysis, an association should be considered commercial, and
therefore subject to rationally related state regulation of its
membership, "when, and only when, the association's activities are
not predominantly of the type protected by the First
Amendment."6 9
Even if the entity's activities are not
against a woman. See, e.g., Hilands Golf Club v. Ashmore, 922 P.2d 469
(Mont. 1996) (upholding a ruling of the Montana Human Rights Commission
that a golf club discriminated based on gender in its public accommodations).
62. Warfield, 896 P.2d at 798.
63. Id. at 794.
64. Id. at 797.
65. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
66. Id. at 621 (reasoning that constitutional protection is not warranted
because "numerous nonmembers of both genders regularly participate in a
substantial portion of activities central" to the organization).
67. Id. at 635 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
68. Id.
69. Id.
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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predominantly commercial, it may still be subject to rationally
related state regulation because courts are required to balance the
discriminatee's equitable interests in inclusion against the
organization's right of association. 0
The California Supreme Court followed Roberts in the Warfield
case, since the country club in question had women who were
allowed to remain lesser members or full members through a
grandfather clause despite the amendment to its by-laws
prohibiting women from attaining full proprietary membership.71
Furthermore, the California Court ruled that First Amendment
freedom of association protections are inapplicable, since a menonly requirement would not advance a specific purpose in the
club's membership, npor would the inclusion of women impair any
of its goals.72

The California decision has been criticized for several reasons.
For example, while it held that one specific private club is a
business establishment, it created no clear rule as to when a private
club constitutes a business establishment for purposes of Unruh.73
In addition, there has been criticism that the California Court only
applied California's business establishment test because of the
private nature of the club, ignoring the United States Supreme
Court's "predominantly commercial activity test" expounded in
Roberts.74 Nevertheless, California took a bold step and ruled that
this type of discrimination, even by private country clubs, is
unacceptable and will not be tolerated if it qualifies as a business
establishment.

70. Id.
71. Warfield, 896 P.2d at 798.
72. Id. See also Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S.
537 (1987).
73. Warfield, 896 P.2d at 798.
74. Even if an organization is not predominately commercial, discrimination
can still be found when balancing the wronged party's equitable interests against

an organizations right of association.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol8/iss1/9
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V. THE CONNECTICUT LAW FURTHERS THE WORTHY GOAL OF
ERADICATING DISCRIMINATION IN A CONSTITUTIONALLY
PERMISSIBLE MANNER

Connecticut has always been in the forefront of ensuring
equality among all its citizens. 7' Given the Court's equal rights
jurisprudence, the Connecticut Supreme Court will probably
uphold this legislation if challenged. Ten years ago, Connecticut's
high court, with a woman serving as its Chief Justice, interpreted
Connecticut's public accommodations law 76 very broadly in
Quinnipiac Council, Boys Scouts of America, Inc. v. Commission
77 to include business
on Human Rights and Opportunities
7
8
establishments. The Court ruled that the definition of a public
accommodation in Connecticut is "any establishment which caters
or offers its services or facilities or goods to the general public."79
Additionally, the Connecticut Supreme Court took its cue from the
recent United States Supreme Court decisions of Roberts and
Rotary International to proclaim that its public accommodations
laws "plainly serve compelling state interests of the highest
order,"8" and that these laws "serve . . .the state's interest in
eliminating discrimination against women.""
In Quinnipiac, the Connecticut court ruled that once an
organization has determined to "eschew selectivity," it may not
discriminate among the general public.82 However, this mandate
alone is not enough to stop gender discrimination at country clubs.
It is improbable that a court would hold that merely allowing
guests to be present and participate while accompanied by a
75. See, e.g., Evening Sentinel v. National Organization for Women, 357
A.2d 498, 503 (Conn. 1975) (stating in dictum that the people and legislators of
Connecticut have unambiguously indicated an intent to abolish sex
discrimination, given its approval of the equal rights amendment to the United
States Constitution).

76. CoNN. GEN. STAT. §46a-64(a) (1997).
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

528 A.2d at 352 (Conn. 1987).
Id. at 355.
Id. at 358 (quoting CONN. GEN. STAT. § 2464c (Sup. 1953)).
Id. (quoting Roberts, 468 U.S. at 624.)
Id.
Quinnipiac Council,528 A.2d at 359.
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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member would cause a country club to forfeit its claim of
selectivity. The country club would therefore not be accountable.
Moreover, this would not protect women members who pay the
same amount as men, it would only protect the general public.
Therefore, to prevent the relegation of women to second-class
citizenship on the golf course, Connecticut's new law is an
appropriate and necessary safeguard.
Last year, in United States v. Virginia, " the United States
Supreme Court found that the Virginia Military Institute's ("VMI")
long-held tradition of excluding women from attending violated
the Fourteenth Amendment.84 The Supreme Court held that the
exclusion of women at VMI did not serve an important
government interest and was entirely discriminatory. As a result,
VMI's single-sex status was eliminated." In her majority opinion,
Justice Ginsburg wrote that sex classifications may be used "to
compensate women for particular economic disabilities they have
suffered, to promote equal employment opportunity, ... [b]ut such
classifications may not be used to create or perpetuate the legal,
social, or economic inferiority of women."86 The United States
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit followed the Supreme
Court's mandate in VMI when it decided Cohen v. Brown
University,8 7 stating that "from the mere fact that a remedy flowing
from a judicial determination of discrimination is gender
conscious, it does not follow that the remedy constitutes
'affinmative action' or reverse discrimination." 8
The Connecticut law easily fits within the United States
Supreme Court's guidelines. This purpose of this Act is to
83. 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996) [hereinafter VIvi].
84. Id. at 2269. VMI barred the admission of women since its inception in
1839 due to its "adversative method" of military instruction. When ordering
VMI to admit women, the Court determined this manner of military instruction
as not inherently unsuitable to women.
85. Id. The Court analyzed Virginia's practice using "intermediate scrutiny,"
the traditional method of determining whether gender classifications are
constitutional. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). To satisfy this
scrutiny, the law or practice must serve an important state interest and be
substantially related to that interest.
86. Id. at 2276.
87. 101 F.3d at 155 (1st Cir. 1996).
.88. Id. at 172.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol8/iss1/9
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eradicate the economic and social suffering of women who have
joined these clubs, paid the same amount as men, but are not given
the same treatment. It does not favor women over men; it only
seeks to put men and women on equal footing while not putting
males at a disadvantage. While the Act may be limited in its
application to affluent women who can afford club fees, this law
does promote Connecticut's long-standing commitment to gender
equality and seeks to eliminate second-class citizenship of women,
regardless of their success in other areas.
VI. CONCLUSION

One concern with the statute is that its language may not
adequately assure that the purpose of equal tee times will be
achieved due to the term "comparable." Although the law's
sponsor explained that the current practice of weekend tee times
for men and weekday tee times for women is not acceptable
because it is not desirable, a court interpreting the statute may not
see it the same way. If only the plain meaning is afforded to the
word "comparable," it is possible that a court will allow a country
club to maintain its tee time policies if properly categorized as an
"event" and equal time is allotted elsewhere to women-only play.
On the other hand, it is possible that Rep. Scalettar's statements
that "comparable" means "desirable" would be given some weight
if a court examined the statute's legislative history and intent.
Furthermore, the Connecticut Supreme Court has consistently held
that a statute should not be interpreted in any way to thwart its
purpose.89 Thus, despite this flaw, it is probable that the intent of
the Act will still be honored.
Connecticut should be commended for attempting to eliminate
discrimination of women country club members. While critics
may claim that women who can afford hefty initiation fees and
dues just to play golf do not deserve the protection of the
legislature, discrimination on any level should not be condoned. It
took courage for Connecticut to take on these exclusive fortresses
89. Evening Sentinel, 357 A.2d at 502 (quoting Turner v. Scanlon, 148 A.2d

334 (Conn. 1959)).
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of wealth and power, and given Connecticut's and the United
States Supreme Court's stances on gender discrimination, the
measure will most likely be upheld if challenged on Constitutional
grounds.

Joseph B. Chervin
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